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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann, §78-2-2(3)(g)
and (j)«

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the 1987 version of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the

"Immunity Act") is constitutional insofar as it limits recovery from the State of Utah and state
entities to $250,000.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
AND STATUTES
Utah Constitution, Article I, Sections 7, 11 and 24, attached hereto at Addendum 1.
Sections 63-30-3, 63-30-2 and 63-30-34 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah
Code Ann. §63-30-1, et seq. as they existed in January of 1989, attached hereto at Addendum
2.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs' filed this legal malpractice action against Defendants on August 7, 1991.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, who were retained to represent Plaintiffs, were negligent in
recommending to Plaintiffs that they settle certain claims against the University Hospital for
$250,000. (R. 7, Comp. 117).
Defendants filed motions for summary judgment arguing that the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann., §63-30-34 (1987) limited Plaintiffs' potential recovery against
the University Hospital to $250,000, and that as a result, the Defendants' conduct in
recommending settlement was reasonable, as a matter of law, and Plaintiffs' suffered no
damages recoverable against Defendants.

After extensive briefing and oral argument, the

Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, by Order dated April 14, 1992, denied Defendants' motions.
(R. 726).
Defendants filed a Joint Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order with this
Court on April 28, 1992. The Court granted the Petition by Order dated June 23, 1992.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about December 13, 1988, Plaintiff Shelly Hipwell entered McKay-Dee Hospital
to give birth to her second child by caesarean section. (R. 4, Comp. 18). Because of the highrisk nature of her condition, she was subsequently transferred to the University of Utah Medical
Center. (R. 4, Comp. ]9).1 While at the University Hospital on January 18, 1989, Hipwell
underwent a bone marrow draw. During the course of this procedure, Hipwell's heart was
punctured and she sustained serious injuries and went into a coma. (R. 5, Comp. 110).2
On or about February 10, 1989, Shelly Hipwell's mother, Sherry Jensen, and her
husband, Shayne Hipwell, retained Defendant Roger T. Sharp to represent them with respect to
any potential claims against all potentially culpable parties. (R. 5-6, Comp. 113). Defendant
Sharp subsequently associated Defendant Tim W. Healy as co-counsel. (R. 5-6, Comp. 113).
Hipwell's mother and husband were duly appointed as her co-guardians. (R. 3, Comp. 112 and
3).

l

The University Medical Center houses the University of Utah College of Medicine, the College of Nursing,
and the College of Pharmacy, which are departments of the University of Utah. The University Medical Center also
houses the University of Utah Hospital, which has a separate organizational structure, but is organized under the
authority of and constitutes a part of the University of Utah. These entities are collectively referred to herein as
the "University Hospital." (Affidavit of Walter Stevens, Ph.D., \2, R. 289-290).
2

Shelly Hipwell died on May 27, 1992 (R. 728).

2

Defendants negotiated a $250,000 settlement proposal with counsel for the University
Hospital and on May 15, 1989, a Verified Petition for Court Approval of Settlement, and for
Authority to Disburse Funds was filed in the Second Judicial District Court for Weber County,
State of Utah, Probate No. 893917059CG. The petition was executed by both Shayne Hipwell
and Sherry Jensen. (R. 222-228). That same day, Defendants and Plaintiffs appeared before
the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor regarding the petition. Shortly thereafter, Judge Taylor
entered the Order Approving Settlement and for Authority to Disburse Funds. In the order,
Judge Taylor stated:
It appears to the Court that the offer . . . to pay the sum of
$250,000.00 . . . is fair and reasonable.
(R. 232).
Plaintiffs, after receiving the benefit of the settlement for more than two years,
commenced this legal malpractice action on August 7, 1991.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs have sued Defendants for legal malpractice arising out of Defendants' alleged
breach of the standard of care in recommending to Plaintiffs that they settle potential claims
against the University Hospital for $250,000. Plaintiffs' cannot state a claim for relief against
Defendants because an attorney can only be liable for legal malpractice if his conduct
proximately causes the former client to suffer damages. Under the clear language of the version
of the Immunity Act in effect in January of 1989 when Plaintiffs' claims against the University
Hospital arose, recovery from all governmental entities for conduct for which governmental

3

immunity has been waived is limited to $250,000 for one person and $500,000 for two or more
persons in any one occurrence.3 Accordingly, Plaintiffs' potential recovery against the
University Hospital was limited to $250,000, and as a result, Defendants conduct cannot, as a
matter of law, be found to be the proximate cause of any damages suffered by Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs have challenged the constitutionality of the recovery limitation under the "open
courts" provision of the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11, the equal protection provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 24 of the
Utah Constitution, the due process provision of the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7, and
this Court's decision in Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989).
This Court's decision in Condemarin is not controlling because it did not address the
1987 version of the Immunity Act. In addition, the basic premise supporting the analysis and
conclusions reached by each member of the plurality in Condemarin is incorrect due to incorrect
briefing by the parties, and as a result, the analysis used and the conclusions reached by the
plurality are incorrect.
In Condemarin. this Court held that the 1978 version of the Immunity Act treated
governmentally-owned hospitals and health care facilities different from other governmental
entities by enacting a recovery limitation for judgments arising from the proprietary conduct of
such entities. The 1987 version of the Immunity Act materially changed governmental immunity
in Utah because, under the 1987 version, the recovery limitation applies to judgments against
all governmental entities for liability based on all conduct for which immunity has been waived,

^Throughout this brieff the applicable version of the Immunity Act will be referred to as the "1987 version " as
a result of significant amendments to the Immunity Act made in 1987.

4

proprietary and governmental.

This material change addresses one of the classifications

identified by the plurality in Condemarin and eliminates that classification as a basis for the
conclusions reached by the plurality.
In addition to the significant changes resulting from the 1987 amendments to the
Immunity Act, the analysis used and the conclusions reached by the plurality in Condemarin are
incorrect, and as a result, should not be followed in this case. In Condemarin. Justice Durham,
Justice Zimmerman and Justice Stewart (collectively referred to as the "plurality") each based
their analysis and conclusions on the premise that state entities did not enjoy immunity for
proprietary conduct at common law. Based on this premise, the plurality members each
determined that the recovery limitation of the 1978 version of the Immunity Act infringed upon
rights protected by the "open courts" provision of the Utah Constitution. Based upon this
determination, Justice Durham and Justice Stewart both applied a heightened scrutiny standard
in their respective equal protection analysis, and Justice Zimmerman did not apply the general
presumption of constitutionality and shifted the burden of proof to the State in connection with
his due process analysis.
However, at common law, state entities did enjoy governmental immunity for all conduct,
proprietary and governmental. In addition, prior Utah case law and case law from numerous
other courts establish that "open courts" provisions only prevent the abolition of causes of action
that were recognized at the time the applicable constitution was ratified. Because governmental
immunity barred all causes of action against state entities at common law for damages resulting
from proprietary conduct, "open courts" provisions cannot be used to invalidate statutes which
retain original immunities.

Because "open courts" provisions do not apply, the general

5

presumption of constitutionality, the general burden of proof and the minimum scrutiny standard
are applicable.
Courts have uniformly recognized that the legislature has the authority and power with
respect to governmental immunity.

Legislative enactments generally, and governmental

immunity statutes specifically, enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality, and should not
be declared unconstitutional unless the party challenging the statute proves that it is
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.
Applying these general principles to the 1987 version of the Immunity Act, this Court
should find that the recovery limitation is constitutional as a reasonable and rational means for
achieving the legislative purpose behind governmental immunity, i.e., protecting the public
coffers from unforeseen and unexpected damage awards and allowing for fiscal certainty in
carrying out the expanding responsibilities of government. Based on this conclusion, the Court
should find that Plaintiffs cannot establish a claim for relief against Defendants.

ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS AGAINST THESE DEFENDANTS SHOULD
BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THE IMMUNITY ACT LIMITED
PLAINTIFFS' RECOVERY FROM THE UNIVERSITY
HOSPITAL TO $250.000,
A.

Plaintiffs Must Establish Damages Proximately Caused by Defendants' Breach of
the Standard of Care in Order to Recover on Their Legal Malpractice Claim.

The following are the essential elements of a legal malpractice claim in Utah:
1.

an attorney/client relationship;

2.

a duty of the attorney to the client;

3.

a breach of the duty; and

6

4.

damages suffered by the client and proximately caused by

the attorney's breach of the duty.
Williams v. Barber, 765 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah 1988); see also, Breuer-Harrison. Inc. v. Combe.
799 P.2d 716, 727 (Utah App. 1990).
In this case, the essence of Plaintiffs' claim is that Defendants, in various ways, breached
the standard of care by recommending that Plaintiffs settle their claims against the University
Hospital for $250,000. To establish their claim, Plaintiffs must show that Defendants breached
the standard of care by recommending the settlement. In addition, Plaintiffs must show that had
they pursued their claims against the University Hospital, they would have recovered in excess
of $250,000. The leading treatise on legal malpractice has explained this concept of proximate
cause as follows:
[T|he plaintiff must establish that the attorney's negligence
proximately caused the loss of a valid and collectible claim. Thus,
the attorney's failure to prosecute a lawsuit cannot be the
proximate cause of a loss if the client did not have a viable cause
of action.
R. Mallen and J. Smith, Legal Malpractice (3d Ed. 1989) Vol. 2, §24.14 at pp. 487-88
(emphasis added).
This Court has applied this same rule of proximate cause in several legal malpractice
cases. In Young v. Bridwell. 437 P.2d 686, 689 (Utah 1968), the Court stated:
(T]n order to make out a cause of action against the attorney for
failing to advise of their right to appeal, it would have to be shown
that there was at least a reasonable likelihood of reversing the
judgment and that it would have benefitted the plaintiff.
In Dunn v. McKay. Burton. McMurray & Thurman. 584 P.2d 894 (Utah 1978), this
Court was asked to determine whether the trial court was correct in granting the defendants'
7

motion for directed verdict on the grounds that plaintiff had failed to establish a cause of action
because she had shown no damages proximately caused by the attorney's conduct. This Court
affirmed the trial court, finding that there was no evidence that the attorney's conduct was the
proximate cause of any damages. Id. at 897.
The proximate cause rule was most recently followed in Williams v. Barber. 765 P.2d
887 (Utah 1988). There, this Court held that the element of proximate cause requires an
assessment of the merits of the underlying action, and stated:
When an attorney breaches such a duty, he is liable for all
damages directly and proximately caused by his act or failure to
act. Generally speaking, incurring liability through a breach of
duty does not necessarily result in damages. The adoption fof such
a rule] would require this Court to either ignore the requirement
of proximate cause with respect to a finding of damages in tort or
expand the concept of liability beyond its commonly held meaning.
Id. p. 889 (emphasis added).
Based upon these cases, it is clear that if Plaintiffs' recovery from the University Hospital
were limited to $250,000, Plaintiffs cannot establish the proximate cause element of their claims
against the Defendants.
B.

The 1987 Version of the Immunity Act Limited Plaintiffs' Recovery from the
University Hospital to $250.000.

Plaintiffs' claims against the University Hospital arose in January of 1989, and are
therefore governed by the version of the Immunity Act in effect at that time. At that time, the
clear language of the Immunity Act limited the recoverable damages from all governmental
entities, including the University Hospital, for all conduct for which governmental immunity was
waived to $250,000. The Immunity Act stated, in pertinent part:

8

Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all
governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury which
results from the exercise of a governmental function,
governmentally-owned hospital, . . .
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 (1985).
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political
subdivisions as defined in this chapter.
(4)(a) "Governmental Function" means any act, failure to act,
operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity
whether or not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or
undertaking is characterized as governmental, proprietary, a core
governmental function, unique to government, undertaken in a dual
capacity, essential to or not essential to a government or
government function, or could be performed by private enterprise
or private persons.
(9) "State" means the State of Utah, and includes any office, department,
agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, university,
or other instrumentality of the state.
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-2 (1987).
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), if a judgment for
damages for personal injury against a governmental entity, or an
employee whom a governmental entity has a duty to indemnify,
exceeds $250,000 for one person . . ., the court shall reduce the
judgment to that amount, regardless of whether or not the function
giving rise to the injury is characterized as governmental.
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-34 (1987).
From these provisions, it is clear that the University Hospital is a "governmental entity,"
that all conduct of the University Hospital is deemed to be a "governmental function" and that
recovery from governmental entities is limited, under all circumstances where complete
immunity does not exist, to $250,000.

Accordingly, unless the recovery limitation is

constitutionally infirm as applied to the University Hospital, Plaintiffs' recovery against the
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University Hospital was limited to $250,000, and therefore, Plaintiffs' claims that Defendants
negligently recommended a $250,000 settlement must fail as a matter of law.
H. THE HISTORY OF STATE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY AND
THE IMMUNITY ACT DEMONSTRATES THAT THE STATE AND
STATE ENnTIES ENJOYED COMPLETE IMMUNITY AT COMMON
LAW, AND THAT THE LEGISLATURE HAS THE AUTHORITY
TO LIMIT RECOVERY FROM GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES.
A,

Prior to the Enactment of the Immunity Act, the State and State Entities Were
Immune from all Liability Unless Expressly Waived by the Legislature.

A line of prior decisions of this Court establishes that (1) the State of Utah and all state
entities were immune from all tort liability at common law; and (2) the Legislature has the sole
authority for making state entities respond in damages. In Wilkinson v. State. 134 P. 626 (Utah
1913), the plaintiff sued the State, the State Engineer, and the State Board of Land
Commissioners for damages to his land and crops caused by the State's construction of an
irrigation reservoir and canal. The defendants filed a demurrer to the complaint which was
denied.

Defendants then appealed, asserting the doctrine of governmental immunity. In

reversing the trial court, the Court stated:
[Tjn the absence of either express constitutional or statutory
authority an action against a sovereign state cannot be maintained,
The doctrine is elementary and of universal application, and so far
as we are aware there is not a single authority to the contrary.
Id. at 630; see also, Campbell Building Co. v. State Road Comm'n.. 70 P.2d 857, 861 (Utah
1937) ("action may not be maintained [against the State Road Commission] unless the State has,
through legislative or constitutional action, given consent to be sued;" "[S]uit against the State
may not be maintained for negligence or tort because no authorization for such is found in the
statutes"); State v. District Court, 78 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1937) (the State Road Commission
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is an agency of the State and "the state cannot be sued unless it has given its consent or has
waived immunity"); Bingham v. Board of Education. 223 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah 1950) ("while
law writers, editors and judges have criticized and disapproved the foregoing doctrine of
governmental immunity as illogical and unjust, the weight of precedent of decided cases supports
the general rule and we prefer not to disregard a principle so well established without statutory
authority;" "under our constitution, the power to make departments of the state respond in
damages for torts rests with the legislature, and without legislative enactment we are unable to
impose any liability or obligation upon [departments of the state]").
From these cases, it is clear that in Utah, the State and all state entities are, and have
always been, immune from all liability unless the Legislature has given its consent or waived
immunity.
B.

Prior to the Enactment of the Immunity Act. Municipalities Enjoyed
Immunity Only for Governmental Functions.

Although the State of Utah and all state entities enjoyed immunity for all conduct at
common law, the same is not true for municipalities.
Municipal corporations do not fully partake of the state's immunity
because of their peculiar nature. They are on the one hand
subdivisions of the state exercising governmental powers, but on
the other hand they engage in activities similar to those of private
corporations. Because of this dual character, the immunity of the
state is extended to the municipality only when it acts in a
governmental capacity. Where the municipal corporation acts in
a private corporate capacity, it is liable for its torts. This rule of
law seems to be uniform throughout the country.
Note, Tort Claims Against the State of Utah. 5 Utah L. Rev. 233, 236-37 (1956) (emphasis
added); see also, Crowder v. Salt Lake County. 552 P.2d 646, 647 (Utah 1976) ("prior to 1965,
actions for negligence could not have been maintained against the State or its political
11

subdivisions for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe or dangerous condition of any road or
bridge except municipalitiesM); Bingham v. Board of Education, 223 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah 1950)
(recognizing dual character of municipal corporations and different application of immunity as
a result of dual character).
This Court most recently recognized this distinction in Standiford v. Salt Lake City
Corp.. 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980) when it stated:
In the past, public entities at the State and county levels had a
greater immunity than did those at the municipal level. However,
we note, without deciding, that the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act casts serious doubt on the viability of this distinction because
the Act does not differentiate between the State and its political
subdivisions.
Id. at 1233 n.3.4
Accordingly, at common law, there was a significant difference between the immunity
afforded the State and the immunity afforded municipalities. Municipalities enjoyed immunity
only for conduct performed in the exercise of a governmental function while the State and state
entities enjoyed immunity for all conduct.
C.

The Immunity Act Arguably Eliminated the Distinction Between the State and
Municipalities.

In 1965, the Legislature enacted the original version of the Immunity Act. When
enacted, §63-30-3 arguably eliminated the distinction between the State and municipalities and

4

In Standiford. 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980), this Court extensively reviewed the case law concerning the
proprietary/governmental distinction. Every Utah case cited by the Court in Standiford concerning the distinction
involved a municipality, and counsel for Healy have been unable to find a single pre-Immunity Act Utah case
involving the State or a state entity that considered the proprietary/governmental distinction.
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also arguably eliminated the State's immunity for non-governmental, proprietary functions.5
Section 63-30-3 read:
Except as may be otherwise provided in the act, all governmental
entities shall be immune from suit for any injury which may result
from the activities of said entities wherein said entity is engaged
in the exercise and discharge of a governmental function.
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 (1965).6
Accordingly, although the State and state entities had previously enjoyed tort immunity
for all conduct, proprietary and governmental, the 1965 enactment of the Immunity Act arguably
waived immunity for liability arising from the performance of non-governmental functions. In
explaining the status of the law at that time, this Court stated:
Under that framework, the right to maintain an action against the
state or its political subdivisions can result (1) from a finding that
the injury did not result from the exercise of a governmental
function, or (2) from a finding that even though the injury resulted
from the exercise of a governmental function, the government's
immunity has been expressly waived in one of the sections of the
Act.
Madsen v. Borthick. 658 P.2d 627, 630 (Utah 1983).7

Because the State and state entities were immune for all conduct prior to the enactment of the Immunity Act,
it is reasonable to assume that the drafters of the Immunity Act intended to retain the common law immunity for the
State and state entities subject only to specified waivers. Section A. 2 of the Brief of Appellant Roger Sharp more
fully addresses this alternative reading of the 1965 Immunity Act.
6

Section 63-30-2(2)(1965) defined the term "governmental entity" to mean the state and its "political
subdivisions," section 63-30-2(l)(1965) defined the term "state" to mean "the State of Utah or any office,
department,. . . hospital,. . .," and section 63-30-2(3)(1965) defined the term "political subdivision" to mean "any
county, city, town, . . ."
Recovery for liability under the second category was limited to sums that were available from insurance
coverage purchased by governmental entities, subject to certain minimum insurance requirements. Utah Code Ann.
§63-30-29 and 63-30-34 (1965). The minimum limits were $100,000 for one person and $300,000 for two or more
persons.
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D.

The 1978 Amendments to the Immunity Act Reinstated the State's
Immunity From Suits Arising from the Operation of Governmentally-Owned
Hospitals.

In 1978, the Legislature amended §63-30-3 to reinstate immunity from suits for injury
arising from the operation of governmentally-owned hospitals. Section 63-30-3 was amended
to read:
Except as may be otherwise provided in this act, all governmental
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the
exercise of a governmental function, governmentally-owned
hospital, nursing home, or other governmental health care facility.
(Emphasis added).
After the 1978 amendments, this Court, in two separate decisions, recognized and held
that if the Legislature includes governmentally-owned health care facilities among immune
entities in §63-30-3, then those entities are entitled to immunity. In Standiford v. Salt Lake City
Corp.. 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980), the Court stated:
Subsequent to the decision rendered in Greenhalgh v.
Payson City, supra, §63-30-3 was amended to specifically exempt
governmentally-owned hospitals . . . . To the extent that the
Payson City hospital is now covered by §63-30-3, the holding in
Greenhalgh has been legislatively overruled.
Id. at 1232 n.2.
In Frank v. State. 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980), this Court was called upon to determine
whether the immunity granted to the University of Utah Medical Center through the 1978
amendment should have retroactive application. The Court stated:
The Utah legislature resolved the health care classification
question in 1978 by an amendment to the [Immunity Act],
whereunder governmental entities are granted immunity from suit
for injury relating to the public ownership and operation of a
hospital, nursing home, or other health care facility. While the
14

amended reenactment of the provision in question was not made
expressly retroactive, and the present action arose prior to its
passage, we are disinclined, as a matter of judicial policy, to
disregard the obvious manifestation of legislative intent reflected
in the amendment, for this reason, we hold the operation of a
governmentally-owned health care facility such as the University
Medical Center to be a 'governmental function' as contemplated by
statute prior to amendment.
Id. at 519 (citations omitted).
In 1989, for reasons that will be discussed in detail below, this Court departed from the
basic premise established by the common law and concluded that the 1978 amendments "created"
immunity for governmentally-owned hospitals that in conjunction with the recovery limitation
statute operated to deprive plaintiffs of rights they held at common law.

Condemarin v,

University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989).
E.

The 1987 Amendments to the Immunity Act Reinstated Immunity for all
Governmental Entities for Proprietary Conduct.

In 1987, after all of the appellate briefs in Condemarin had been submitted to the Court,
the Immunity Act was amended to include all activities of governmental entities, including the
activities of the University Hospital, within the definition of "governmental function:"
(4)(a) "Governmental Function" means any act, failure to act,
operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity
whether or not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or
undertaking is characterized as governmental, proprietary, a core
governmental function, unique to government, undertaken in a dual
capacity, essential to or not essential to a government or
government function, or could be performed by private enterprise
or private persons.
(3) "Government Entity" means the state and its political subdivisions as defined
in this chapter.
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(9) "State" means the State of Utah, and includes any office, department,
agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, university,
or other instrumentality of the state.
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-2 (1987) (emphasis added).
The effect of these amendments is to reinstate immunity for state entities for all conduct,
including proprietary conduct. This Court did not consider the constitutionality of the 1987
amendments to the Immunity Act in Condemarin.8
F.

This Court Has Always Recognized that the Legislature Has Sole Authority to
Determine the Scope and Breadth of Immunity.

Both before and after the Immunity Act, this Court recognized that the Legislature has
the sole right, absent delegation to the courts, to determine the scope and breadth of any waiver
of governmental immunity. In Campbell Building Co. v. State Road Comm'n. 70 P.2d 857, 862
(Utah 1937), this Court stated:
[W]hen there is statutory consent to sue, the statute is the measure
of the power to sue.
Id. at 862 (emphasis added); see also, Campbell v. Pack. 389 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1964) ("It
should be left entirely to the legislature to determine whether the immunity should be removed,
and as to what agencies; when effective, and to what extent, if any, limitations should be
prescribed").
Even during the time period between 1965 and 1978, when the courts were given the
responsibility for determining what did and what did not constitute a "governmental function,"

^Justice Stewart did refer to the increase in the amount of the recovery limitation from $100,000 to $250,000
at footnote 1 on page 370. However, he did not address the overall changes made by the 1987 amendments.
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this Court continued to recognize that it is the Legislature that controls the existence of
immunity. In Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980), the Court stated:
(TJhe Legislature designed this statutory scheme to allow the
courts flexibility and adaptability in fashioning consistent and
rational limits to governmental immunity. To that end, the
Legislature intended the courts to have the power to restrict the
scope of governmental immunity.
Id. at 1232 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Madsen v. Borthick. 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983), the
Court stated:
[The Immunity Act] significantly altered the common law of
sovereign immunity, and substituted a statutory framework to be
interpreted by the courts and reshaped by the Legislature as
necessary from time to time.
Id. at 629-30 (emphasis added).
The ultimate proof of the Legislature's authority in this area was reflected in Standiford
when the Court stated that the legislative amendment to §63-30-3, adding governmental health
care facilities to the definition of governmental function, "legislatively overruled" an earlier
Utah Supreme Court decision in which a city hospital was found to be subject to suit. Id. at
1232 n.2.
Finally, even in holding some aspects of the 1978 version of the Immunity Act
unconstitutional, Justice Durham's opinion in Condemarin still recognized that the Legislature
controls the area of governmental immunity.
We now observe, however, that the legislature did not make the
operation of a health care facility a "'government function' as
contemplated by statute," as the Court said in Frank. Rather, the
legislature simply added to the category of government entities
covered by section 63-30-3 . . .
Id. at 351 (emphasis by court).
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Accordingly, although the Legislature has from time-to-time delegated to the courts the
authority and responsibility for determining the scope and breadth of governmental immunity,
the Legislature has always been recognized as the branch of government with the power and
responsibility for determining the scope and breadth of governmental immunity.
HI. THIS COURT'S DECISION IN CONDEMARIN DOES NOT ADDRESS
THE 1987 AMENDMENTS AND SHOULD NOT BE FOLLOWED IN
ANALYZING THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED IN THLS CASE.
The plaintiff in Condemarin sustained her injury in 1982. At that time, the 1978 version
of the Immunity Act was in effect. Shortly after her injury, the Condemarin plaintiff filed suit
and moved for summary judgment. The motion was denied, and the plaintiff then petitioned for
and was granted an interlocutory appeal before this Court. In deciding Condemarin. the Justices
of this Court issued four separate opinions: a plurality opinion authored by Justice Durham, a
concurring opinion authored by Justice Zimmerman, a concurring opinion authored by Justice
Stewart, and a dissenting opinion authored by Justice Hall and joined by Justice Howe. Because
none of the opinions mention the 1987 amendments, it is clear that the Condemarin decision
did not address the issues raised by this appeal.
A.

The Basic Premise Underlying the Court's Constitutional Analysis in Condemarin
is Incorrect.

Although the Condemarin decision does not apply to the 1987 version of the Immunity
Act, Plaintiffs have taken the position that the analysis adopted by the plurality in Condemarin,
if followed in this case, would result in the 1987 version being held unconstitutional. However,
because the basic premise underlying the decision in Condemarin is incorrect, the Court's
analysis and conclusion are also flawed and should not be followed.
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In Condemarin. this Court found that the recovery limitation, as it applied to the
University Hospital, was unconstitutional. However, in order to understand the basis for this
seemingly simple conclusion, careful examination of the various opinions is necessary. First,
Justice Hall and Justice Howe dissented, finding the recovery limitation constitutional. In
writing the plurality opinion, Justice Durham found both equal protection and due process
reasons for holding the recovery limitation unconstitutional. 775 P.2d at 352-64. In a separate
concurring opinion, Justice Zimmerman joined only in Justice Durham's due process analysis.
Id. at 366. Justice Stewart found the due process analysis inapplicable, but joined with Justice
Durham on equal protection grounds. Id. at 369.
The basic underlying premise to the analysis used and the conclusions reached by Justice
Durham, Justice Zimmerman and Justice Stewart is that at common law, the State and state
entities were not immune for liability arising out of the performance of proprietary or nongovernmental functions.9 Justice Durham wrote that "at common law the proprietary or non-

The origin of the plurality's incorrect finding that state entities did not enjoy immunityfor proprietary conduct
at common law is clearly the parties7 failure to recognize and address the issue. The brief submitted by the
University Hospital erroneously assumed that state entities and municipalities enjoyed the same immunity at common
law:
Under [the] common law there was always discrimination between a person
injured by a state employee functioning in a government capacity and one
injured by a state employee functioning in a proprietary capacity. Under
sovereign immunity the person injured in the governmental function was
absolutely barred from any recovery whereas a complete recovery was possible
as to the proprietary function.
* * *
Since government entities were immune from suit for government activities the
important distinction as to the liability of the entity itself was whether the
function was proprietary or governmental.
Appellate Brief of University Hospital, pp. 35 and 41.
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governmental functions of governmental entities were not protected from liability in Utah." Id.
at 351.
In addition, in analyzing the 1978 amendments, Justice Durham described the addition
of the health care language as follows:
The net result of this classification scheme is that the state,
while choosing to conduct many enterprises that are not essential
and necessary to governing, has chosen to retain immunity for only
one of those activities-health care services-and to extend that
immunity to its employees who function at an operational level
rather than at a policy-making one. In doing so. the state has
extended governmental immunity further than it ever reached at
common law and, in the process, has abrogated a well-established
common law right of recovery.
Id. at 353 (emphasis added). Justice Durham's statement is correct to the extent she is referring
to proprietary functions performed by non-state health care facilities, because such facilities, like
all other non-state entities, did not enjoy immunity at common law. However, as is set forth
above, state health care facilities did enjoy immunity at common law for all conduct, proprietary
and governmental. As a result, the express inclusion of state health care facilities in the 1978
amendments was, indeed, a retention or at least a reinstatement of an original immunity.10
The importance of this incorrect premise to Justice Durham's analysis and ultimate
conclusion is reflected by her statement that she would impose a heightened standard of review
under equal protection because "the legislature has not only limited recovery, but it has also
extended partial governmental immunity to restrict rights which existed at common law." Id.

l0

This retention, or reinstatement, was reiterated again in the 1987 amendments when the legislature broadened
the definition of "governmental function."
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at 356. Similarly, the importance of this incorrect premise was reflected in Justice Durham's
due process analysis when she framed the issue as follows:
The determinative question is therefore whether the recovery cap
can be regarded as a reasonable, non-arbitrary limitation on the
right to recover for tortious injuries in a context where a common
law right to recovery has been restricted.
Id. at 361.
The incorrect premise also played a significant role in Justice Zimmerman's analysis and
determination. In explaining why he believes that the burden of proof should shift to the State,
Justice Zimmerman refers to the legislation as "severely restricting] the right of every person
to recover . . . " Id. at 368. In addition, in concluding that the State failed to meet its burden,
Justice Zimmerman refers to the legislation as "having abridged the important right of citizens
to recover . . . " Id. at 368-69.
Justice Stewart also incorporated this incorrect premise in framing the issue for his equal
protection analysis.
[T]he issue that emerges is whether the Legislature ran afoul of
Article I, section 24 of the . . . Utah Constitution by limiting the
liability of an institution owned by government which performs
nongovernmental activities.
Id. at 372 (emphasis by court).
From these statements it is clear that the plurality each based their respective analysis
upon the incorrect premise that state owned hospitals did not enjoy immunity for nongovernmental functions at common law.
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B.

Based on this Incorrect Premise, the Plurality Each Incorrectly Chose to Apply
a Heightened Scrutiny Standard in Their Constitutional Analysis.

The net result of the use of the incorrect premise is that Justice Durham, Justice
Zimmerman and Justice Stewart each applied a heightened standard of scrutiny in their
respective equal protection and due process analysis. The justification for the heightened
scrutiny in each opinion is the purported violation of a constitutional right protected by Article
1, Section 11 by limiting recovery for a cause of action available at common law. Id. at 358
(Justice Durham -"Because of the constitutional status of the right to a remedy for damage to
one's person under article I, section 11, more (a heightened standard) is required"); Id. at 368
(Justice Zimmerman - "Because the interests at stake are specifically protected by the
constitution, the presumption of validity that normally attaches to legislative action must be
reversed once it is shown that the enactment under scrutiny does, in fact, infringe upon the
interests enumerated in Article I, Section 11"); Id. at 372-373 (Justice Stewart - "The right
involved here is the right to a full remedy for a personal injury, a right protected by Article I,
Section 11 of the Utah Constitution"; "The appropriate standard, in my view, has more bite than
the minimum scrutiny standard...").
However, as set forth above, because there was no right to sue a state-owned hospital
for damages arising out of the performance of non-governmental functions at common law, the
reinstatement of immunity for such liability does not infringe upon the rights protected by Article
I, Section 11.
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution, commonly referred to as the "open courts"
provision, states:
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All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to
him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay . . .
This and similar provisions found in the constitutions of other states are frequently relied upon
by plaintiffs in an attempt to have governmental immunity statutes declared unconstitutional.
However, this argument has almost been universally rejected because "open courts" provisions
only guarantee access to those remedies that existed at the time a state constitution was ratified
and, as no remedy against state entities whatsoever existed at the time of the ratification of the
constitutions because of the doctrine of governmental immunity, "open courts" provisions do not
apply.
This Court previously stated that the "open courts" provision does not affect the law of
governmental immunity in Madsen v. Borthick. 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983). There, the plaintiffs
filed suit against the State of Utah and the Commissioner of Financial Institutions, alleging that
the defendants failed to fulfill their statutory obligation of supervising banks and financial
institutions. The plaintiffs further alleged that as a result of the defendants negligence the
plaintiffs lost substantial amounts of money when the financial institution in which they had
deposited money became insolvent.
The defendants moved to dismiss, claiming that the action was barred by the Immunity
Act. The trial court dismissed the action and the plaintiffs appealed. On appeal, the plaintiffs
argued that statutory and common law governmental immunity was unconstitutional under the
"open courts" provision. This Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument, holding that the "open
courts" provision had no effect on the principle of sovereign immunity.
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Sovereign immunity — the principle that the state cannot be
sued in its own courts without its consent — was a well-settled
principle of American common law at the time Utah became a
state. Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution, which
prescribes that all courts shall be open and persons shall not be
barred from using them to redress injuries, was not meant to create
a new remedy or a new right of action. Consequently, Article I,
section 11 worked no change in the principle of sovereign
immunity, and sovereign immunity is not unconstitutional under
that section.
Id- at 629 (citations omitted).
This principle was also explained in Brown v. Wightman. 151 P. 366 (Utah 1915).
There, the plaintiff sued for wrongful death. However, because wrongful death actions did not
exist at common law, the suit was dismissed. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the dismissal
violated the "open courts" provision. In rejecting this argument, this Court said:
[The "open courts" provision] is a general provision, which in the
same or similar language will be found in the constitutions of at
least 28 states in the union . . . . The courts have, however,
always considered and treated those provisions, not as creating
new rights, or as giving new remedies where none otherwise are
given, but as placing a limitation upon the legislature to prevent
that branch of government from closing the doors of the courts
against any person who has a legal right which is enforceable in
accordance with some known remedy. Where no right of action
is given, however, or no remedy exists, under either the common
law or some statute, those constitutional provisions create none.
. . . The right and power, as well as the duty, of creating rights
and to provide remedies, lies with the legislature, and not with the
courts. Courts can only protect and enforce existing rights, and
they may do that only in accordance with established and known
remedies.
Id. at 366-67.
From these cases it is clear that in Utah, the "open courts" provision applies only to
rights and remedies that existed at the time the constitution was ratified.
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Other courts have applied this same rule of law to challenges to governmental immunity
statutes. In Brown v. Wichita State Univ.. 547 P.2d 1015 (Kan. 1976), cited with approval by
this Court in Madsen. supra. 658 P.2d at 629, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of
a statute reinstating governmental immunity under an "open courts" provision similar to that
found in the Utah Constitution. The Kansas provision stated:
All persons, for injuries suffered in person, reputation or property,
shall have remedy by due course of law, and justice administered
without delay.
Id. at 1023 (quoting Section 18 of Kansas Bill of Rights). The plaintiffs claimed that the state
governmental immunity statutes denied them a remedy against Wichita State University arising
out of a crash of an airplane carrying the university's football team in violation of this
constitutional provision. In Kansas, the doctrine of governmental immunity was judicially
abrogated in 1970.
immunity act.

Subsequently, the legislature enacted a comprehensive governmental

The plaintiffs challenged the governmental immunity statutes as violating

principles of equal protection as well as Kansas' "open courts" provision. In rejecting the
plaintiffs' argument and upholding the governmental immunity statute, the court stated:
[The "open courts" provision] does not create any new
rights, but merely recognizes long established systems of law
existing prior to the adoption of the constitution. Since the right
to sue the state for torts was a right denied at common law, such
right is not protected by Section 18 . . . . It seems unlikely that
the framers of our constitution intended Section 18 to abrogate
governmental immunity. Were this true, our early court decisions
would have reached that result. Instead, our prior decisions
uphold governmental immunity.
Id. at 1023.
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The same argument was made and rejected in Martinez v. Harris County. 808 S.W.2d
257 (Tex. App. 1991), under a constitutional provision stating that, "all courts shall be open,
and every person for an injury done to him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law." Id. at 261 (quoting Texas Constitution, Article I, Section 11).
In upholding the constitutionality of the governmental immunity statutes, the court stated:
[TJn order for the open courts analysis to apply, there must be
some abrogation of a litigant's right to bring a cause of action,
either common law or statutory . . . .
* * *

[Plaintiff] did not have a common law cause of action for
suit against Harris County; he only had a right to sue the county
under the Texas Tort Claims Act. Under the common law
doctrine of sovereign immunity the state and its political
subdivisions, which includes counties, may not be held liable for
torts absent a statutory provision creating such liability. The
Texas Tort Claims Act provides the exception to the doctrine of
sovereign immunity for counties. Thus, [plaintiffs] remedy is not
rooted in the common law, but is statutorily created. Because he
cannot establish that he had a cognizable cause of action that was
restricted by [the statute in question], he has failed to show a
violation of the open courts provision of the constitution.
Id.; see also, Morris v. Blake. 552 A.2d 844, 850 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988) (no cause of action
existed against the county at common law and thus the "open courts" provision of the state
constitution did not affect the doctrine of sovereign immunity); Hale v. Port of Portland. 783
P.2d 506, 509-12 (Or. 1989) (sovereign immunity was firmly in place when the slate constitution
was ratified; thus statute capping damages recoverable from state entities at $100,000 is not
unconstitutional under "open courts" provision); Smith v. City of Philadelphia, 576 A.2d 306,
309 (Pa. 1986) (framers of state constitution would have had no reason to apply "open courts"
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provision to claims against government, as government was immune from suit); Gaspar v.
Freidel. 450 N.W.2d 226 (S.D. 1990) (the "open courts" provision of the state constitution is
not violated when no remedy existed at common law); High-Grade Oil Co.. Inc. v. SommerT
295 N.W.2d 736, 739 (S.D. 1980) (the doctrine of sovereign immunity predates the constitution
and the "open courts" provision of the state constitution has no affect on state statutes imposing
governmental immunity); Stout v. Grand Prairie Independent School Dist.. 733 S.W.2d 290,297
(Tex. App. 1987) (the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity preceded the "open courts"
provision of the state constitution and thus does not affect the constitutionality of the
governmental immunity statutes).
From the prior decisions of this Court and from the decisions of other courts throughout
the country, it is clear that "open courts" provisions, such as that found at Article I, Section 11
of the Utah Constitution, do not apply to rights and remedies that did not exist at the time the
constitution was adopted. Because there was no right of action against a state owned hospital
at common law, the partial reinstatement of immunity from such actions does not violate the
"open courts" provision set forth at Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution. Accordingly,
this Court should not have applied a heightened standard of review in Condemarin.
IV. THIS COURT SHOULD PRESUME THE 1987 VERSION OF THE
IMMUNITY ACT TO BE VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL.
In Condemarin. Justice Zimmerman reversed the usual presumption and shifted the
burden of proof to the State based upon his conclusion that the Immunity Act infringed rights
protected by the "open courts" provision of the Utah Constitution.

Because the premise

underlying the reversal of the presumption and shifting of the burden is incorrect, as set forth
in Section III, this Court should apply the general presumption and burden of proof.
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This Court has repeatedly emphasized that legislative enactments carry a strong
presumption of validity. In Ellis v. Social Services Dept.. 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980), this
Court stated:
There is a general reluctance on the part of the judiciary to declare
a legislative enactment facially unconstitutional. All doubts should
be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute and no act
should be declared unconstitutional unless it is clearly and palpably
so,
A statute must be read to be consistent with basic
constitutional rights, and will be upheld unless it contains a
provision which expressly excludes a constitutional protection.
Id. at 1255-56 (citations omitted); see also, State v. Murphy. 674 P.2d 1220, 1222 (Utah 1983);
Greaves v. State. 528 P.2d 805, 806-07 (Utah 1974) ("it is the well established rule that
legislative enactments are endowed with a strong presumption of validity; and that they should
not be declared unconstitutional if there is any reasonable basis upon which they can be found
to come within the constitutional framework; and that a statute will not be stricken down as
being unconstitutional unless it appears to be so beyond a reasonable doubt") (emphasis added).
Additionally, the party attacking the constitutionality of a statute carries the burden of
proof. See, Utah Assoc. Municipal Power Systems v. Public Service Common,. 789 P.2d 298,
301 (Utah 1990); Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County. 681 P.2d 184, 190-91 (Utah 1984) ("a
party attacking the constitutionality of a statute must affirmatively demonstrate its
unconstitutionality").
In accordance with these principles, the 1987 version of the Immunity Act is entitled to
a strong presumption of validity, and must be given effect unless the Plaintiffs can prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that it is clearly and palpably unconstitutional.
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V. THE PROVISION LIMITING RECOVERY FROM STATE-OWNED
HOSPITALS TO $250.000 DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION.
A.

The Court Should Apply the Minimum Scrutiny Standard in Reviewing the
Recovery Limitation

Principles of equal protection derive from the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and from Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution. Because no fundamental
right or suspect class is involved in this case, the Fourteenth Amendment only requires
application of the minimum scrutiny standard, i.e., that the classification be rationally related
to a valid public purpose. Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake. 817 P.2d 816, 820-21 (Utah
1991). Although Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution incorporates the same general
fundamental purposes as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the test is
somewhat more restrictive. Id. at 821. Under Article I, Section 24, "a law must apply equally
to all persons within a class" and, "the statutory classification and the different treatment given
the classes must be based on differences that have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives
of the statute. Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984).
Numerous courts from other states have addressed the equal protection argument as it
relates to recovery limitations applicable to governmental entities. The Colorado Supreme Court
addressed the issue in Lee v. Colorado Dept. of Health. 718 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1986)(en banc).
There, an injured driver, his wife and their five children filed suit against a state agency and its
employees for injuries sustained by the driver as a result of an automobile collision. The case
was tried to a jury. The jury apportioned fault, 49% to the plaintiffs and 51 % to the defendants,
and found that the driver sustained total damages of $606,409.38, the driver's wife sustained
damages on her claim of loss of consortium of $100,000, and that each of the children sustained
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damages of $10,000. After trial, the trial court entered judgment, limiting the amount of the
driver's recovery to $150,000 pursuant to a Colorado statute that limits the maximum amount
of judgment recoverable against all public entities and their employees to $150,000 for any
injury to one person and $400,000 for injuries to two or more persons in a single occurrence.
Id. at 227. The plaintiffs appealed, asserting that the recovery limitations violate equal
protection.

The court applied the minimum scrutiny, reasonable basis test and imposed the

burden of proving unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt on the plaintiffs.

In finding

that the recovery limits do not violate equal protection, the court stated:
The statutory classification limiting the amounts recoverable
against a public entity is based on real differences in fact between
governmental and private tortfeasors.
Public entities are
responsible for providing a vast array of governmental services to
the public and, as a result, are exposed to far greater liability and
risks than a private individual. Moreover, the public entity, unlike
the private individual, does not have the option of declaring
bankruptcy or going out of business when subjected to tort
liability, but rather must continue to carry out its responsibility to
the public.
*

*

*

We have no hesitation in concluding that this statutory
classification is reasonably related to the governmental objective
of providing fiscal certainty in carrying out the manifold
responsibilities of government. By limiting the liability of a public
entity to a fixed amount, the Governmental Immunity Act protects
the public entity against the risk that unforeseen and unlimited tort
judgments will deplete the public coffers and result in the
termination or substantial curtailment of important government
functions.
Id. at 227-28.
The Idaho Supreme Court addressed this same issue in Leliefeld v. Johnson. 659 P.2d
111 (Ida. 1983). There, a truck driver and his wife filed suit against a second driver and the
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State of Idaho to recover for injuries sustained in an accident. The plaintiffs alleged that the
state was liable based upon the construction and design of the bridge where the accident
occurred. At trial, the jury attributed fault of 10% to the plaintiff, 65% to the other driver and
25% to the state. The jury found damages of $400,000 for plaintiff and $20,000 for plaintiffs
wife. Subsequent to entry of the judgment, the state moved to have the judgment reduced to
$100,000 pursuant to a statute limiting recovery against a governmental entity to $100,000 per
person and $300,000 per occurrence. Id. at 126. In addressing the plaintiffs' equal protection
argument, the court applied a rational basis test and stated:
Although sparse, the legislative history indicates that the legislature
was aware that they were establishing a classification and did so
deliberately and not as a result of accident or ignorance. We deem
it logical to infer from the legislative intent to enact the recovery
limitation and the State's purported objective to protect the public
coffers which the plaintiffs concede is a reasonably conceived
objective that the recovery limitation has a rational basis.
Id. at 128; see also, Packard v. Joint School Dist. No. 171. 661 P.2d 770 (Ida. App.
1983)(followed Leliefeld in affirming trial court's reduction of judgment for wrongful death of
five-year old child struck and killed by school bus from $212,500 to $100,000).
The Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed the equal protection issue in Wilson v. Gipson.
753 P.2d 1349 (Okl. 1988), in a case filed by the parents of five children who were killed and
several other children who suffered serious injuries as a result of an explosion of a water heater
at a public school. The insurance carrier for the school district tendered $300,000 to the trial
court, the maximum amount recoverable from a governmental entity under Oklahoma statute.
The trial court distributed funds for special damages and then divided the remainder equally,
resulting in a distribution of approximately $18,000 to each family.
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The plaintiffs appealed,

asserting that the statute which limits recovery
$300,000 per occurrence is unconstitutional.

to $50,000 for injury to one person and
The court, applying the rational basis test,

concluded that the statute does not violate equal protection. In doing so, the court, like most
of the courts in the cases cited above, stated that it is for the legislature, not the court, to
determine the limits of a governmental entity's liability. Id. at 1353.
Similarly, in Sambs v. Citv of Brookfield. 293 N.W.2d 504 (Wis. 1980), the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that a statutory recovery limitation of $25,000 did not violate equal
protection in a case where the plaintiff, who was rendered a paraplegic, was found to have
damages of $949,645.66. After applying the rational basis test and finding the restriction
constitutional, the court made this observation:
We must acknowledge that the $25,000 statutory limitation
appears low when considering this case which graphically
illustrates the severity of physical injury which may be sustained
by tort victims, the high costs of medical care, and the large
amount of monetary damages awarded. The New Hampshire
Supreme Court recently concluded 'that a $50,000 statutory
limitation is precariously close to the boundary of acceptability'
and urged the legislature, as we do, 'to review periodically all
statutory limitations of recovery, including the one at issue here,
to insure that inflation and political considerations do not lead to
inequitable disparities in treatment.'
Id. at510. n

The following cases have all addressed equal protection challenges to governmental statutory recovery
limitations and have found them to be constitutional: Caulev v. City of Jacksonville, 403 So.2d 379 (Fla.
1981)(applying rational basis test); Lienhardv. State. 431 N. W. 2d 861 (Minn. 1988)(applying rational basis test);
Snyder v. Citv of Minneapolis. 441N. W. 2d 781 (Minn. 1989) (applying rational basis test); State v. Kallio. 557 P. 2d
705 (Nev. 1976); Car2ill v. City of Rochester. 406 A. 2d 704 (N.H. 1979) (applying rational basis test): Hale v. Port
ofPortland. 783 P. 2d 506, 516 (Or. 1989): Smith v. City of Philadelphia. 516A.2d306. 311 (Pa. 1986) (under both
rational basis test and applying heightened scrutiny standard); and Stanhope v. Brown County. 280 N.W.2d 711,
716 (Wis. 1979) (applying rational basis test). In all of our research, we have found only one case where a court
reached the opposite result, Pfost v. State. 713 P. 2d 495 (Mont. 1985)(applying a heightened standard of review
and requiring the state to show a compelling state interest to sustain the constitutionality of the statute because
Montana's immunity act conflicted with the "open courts" provision because of a constitutional amendment in 1972
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Courts have reached the same conclusion when addressing recovery limitations as applied
to state hospitals and medical centers. In Sibley v. Board of Superiors. 462 So.2d 149 (La.
1985), the plaintiff had been transferred from a private hospital to a University Medical Center.
As a result of her treatment at the Medical Center, the plaintiff suffered massive brain damage,
leaving her with the functional IQ of a 10-year old child. The plaintiff had a normal life
expectancy, but would be unable to take care of herself. Prior to trial, the plaintiffs medical
expenses exceeded $423,000. It was expected that a much greater amount would be required
to meet her future long-term needs.
At trial, judgment was entered for the plaintiff but the state's liability was limited to
$500,000 pursuant to statute. The plaintiff appealed, claiming that the liability limit was
unconstitutional under the "open courts", equal protection, and due process clauses. In deciding
the issue, the court first held that the statute did not violate the "open courts" clause. As a
result, the court scrutinized the statute under "the lesser standard of rational basis [scrutiny]."
Id. at 157. The court then concluded that the rational basis test was satisfied and that the
liability cap did not "unconstitutionally violate either the equal protection or due process clauses
of the state or federal constitutions . . . " Id. at 158.
Other cases involving government hospitals have produced the same result. See Tarrant
County Hosp. Dist. v. Ray. 712 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. App. 1986) (statute limiting liability of

that "fsjwept aside all notions of governmental immunity. " Id. at 499). However, the continuing validity of the
decision in Pfost is in question because it was recently overruled to the extent it held that the "open courts"
provision of the Montana Constitution (Article II, Section 16) guarantees a fundamental right. Meech v. Hillhaven
West. Inc.. 776 P. 2d 488, 491 (Mont. 1989). Because the court in Pfost applied a heightened standard of scrutiny
and shifted the burden of proof to the state based upon Article II, Section 16, the conclusions reached by the court
are in serious jeopardy.
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county hospital to $100,000 does not violate equal protection); Neal v. Donahue. 611 P.2d 1125
(Okla. 1980) (statute extending immunity to state hospital does not violate "open courts*1, equal
protection, or due process); Crowe v. Harton Memorial Hosp.. 579 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. App.
1979) (statute limiting the liability of a government hospital to $20,000 does not violate "open
courts," equal protection, or due process); Fritz v. Regents of Univ. of Colorado. 586 P.2d 233
(Colo. 1978) (statute limiting a person's ability to sue the University Hospital does not violate
equal protection); Whitmire v. Jewell. 573 P.2d 573 (Kan. 1977) (statute extending immunity
to University Medical Center does not violate constitution); Malone v. University of Kansas
Medical Center. 552 P.2d 885 (Kan. 1976) (statute extending immunity to University Medical
Center does not violate constitution).
These cases illustrate that courts addressing recovery limitations have uniformly applied
a rational basis test and found that the limitations are reasonably related to the purported purpose
for the limitations. This Court should overrule Condemarin to the extent it applied a heightened
standard of scrutiny and to the extent it shifted the burden of proof to the State. In addition, the
Court should accord the recovery limitation set forth in §63-30-34 the normal presumption of
constitutionality and apply the minimum standard of scrutiny.
B.

The Recovery Limitation is Reasonably Related to the Purposes for the Immunity
Act.

The Immunity Act as a whole, and the recovery limitation in particular, establish a
classification consisting of those persons injured by a governmental entity but who have no
remedy because there has been no waiver of governmental immunity as opposed to those who
have been injured by a governmental entity by conduct for which immunity has been waived but
whose recovery is limited by §63-30-34 and also consisting of those persons injured by the
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conduct of private entities who have unrestricted recourse. The Court may be tempted to create
more limited classifications, such as those referred to in Condemarin. i.e., the classification of
victims of medical malpractice at private hospitals and the victims of medical malpractice at
governmentally owned hospitals, such as the University Hospital (Justice Durham's opinion at
353-54; Justice Stewart's opinion at 373). However, this narrow classification no longer exists
because the 1987 amendments to the Immunity Act, which created a legislative definition of
"governmental function", eliminates the argument that the Legislature selected governmentallyowned hospitals from all entities of government for immunity for proprietary conduct. The 1987
amendments eliminate what this Court perceived in Condemarin to be an attempt to treat
governmentally-owned hospitals different from other entities of government and, accordingly,
this Court must consider a much broader classification in reviewing the constitutionality of the
1987 amendments to the Immunity Act.
Through the 1987 amendments, the Legislature clearly determined that there is certain
conduct for which governmental entities should be immune from liability and that there is other
conduct for which governmental entities should not be immune but for which recovery should
be limited.

The legislative purpose, implicit from the Immunity Act itself, is to protect the

public coffers from unforeseen and unexpected damage awards and to allow for fiscal certainty
in carrying out the expanding responsibilities of government. Under the 1987 version of the
Immunity Act, retaining immunity for some conduct and establishing recovery limitations for
liability for which immunity is waived are reasonable and responsible means of achieving the
legislative purposes and have a reasonable tendency to further those purposes.
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Based on the Immunity Act, governmental entities can purchase liability insurance with
nominal limits for known risks. Without the retained immunity and the recovery limits imposed
by the Immunity Act, governmental entities would be forced to purchase insurance coverage with
extraordinary limits to cover those rare situations where a tort victim's damages exceed the
limits currently found in §63-30-34 or, in the alternative, go uninsured for such catastrophic
losses. Both alternatives require the prudent governmental entity to shift expenditures from
worthwhile programs and activities to provide either reserves against, or to pay insurance
premiums to shift the risk of, a catastrophic loss.
A limitation on recovery is the only rational way to serve the competing purposes of the
Legislature's partial waiver of absolute governmental immunity. A fixed limit of liability at
$250,000, subject to change by the Legislature as circumstances require, is Large enough to
compensate most injured persons and serve the deterrent function of tort liability, while
simultaneously protecting the public treasury from the risk of insolvency or unfeasible tax
burdens that would result from catastrophic judgments. The recovery limitation provides a
crucial element of needed certainty. It supplies a fixed number on which to estimate future
liability based on the best estimate of numbers of claims, thereby enabling governments to
budget for the costs of self-insurance.

In this way, it comprises a central part of the

government's risk management program. As the Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized, risk
management Requires that recovery be restricted at some finite level so that risk exposure can
be projected and informed underwriting decisions can be made." Packard. 661 P.2d at 775.
Without a fixed recovery limitation to cut off unlimited liability, there is no way to project future
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losses realistically. In short, with no recovery limitation in place, budgeting for self-insurance
and all other government expenditures could not be done with any tolerable level of certainty.
The legislative history of 1983 Utah Laws ch. 130 clearly shows that the amount of
Utah's current limit, far from being arbitrary, was reached through the difficult political process
by compromises between competing interests. Utah's limitation is, in fact, $15,000 above the
average of current statutory limits on governmental entity liability in states whose legislatures
have similarly acted to partially waive immunity only up to a fixed dollar amount.12
Deciding whether to give up sovereign immunity and, if so, whether and where to draw
the line of maximum recovery is not a judicial function. As numerous courts have pointed out,
it is the role of the legislature, not the courts,
to evaluate the risks, the extent of exposure to liability, the need
to compensate citizens for injury, the availability of and cost of
insurance, and the financial condition of the governmental units.
It is the legislature's function to structure statutory provisions,
which will protect the public interest in reimbursing the victim and
in maintaining government services and which will be fair and
reasonable to the victim and at the same time will be realistic
regarding the financial burden to be placed on the taxpayers.

12

AUL Code §1 1-93-2 (1975) ($100,000); Colo. Rev. Stat. §24-10-114 (1988) ($150,000); Del. Code Ann. tit.
10, §4012 (Supp. 1990) ($300,000); Fla. Stat. Ann. §768.28(5) (West Supp. 1992) ($100,000);Idaho Code §6-926
(1984) ($500,000 per occurrence); III Ann. Stat. ch. 37, para. 439.8 (Smith-Hurd 1990) ($100,000); Ind. Code
Ann. §34-4-16.5-4 (Burns 1986) ($300,000); Kan. Stat. Ann. §75-6105 (1989) ($500,000per occurrence); Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §44.070 (Michie 1986) ($100,000); Me. Rev. Stat, titl 14, §8105 (West 1964) ($300,000per occurrence);
Md. Code Ann. §5-399.2 (Supp. 1991) (limited to extent of insurance coverage); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 258,
§2 (West 1988) ($100,000); Minn. Stat. Ann. §466.04 (Supp. 1992) ($200,000); Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-15 (Supp.
1991) ($25,000 until July 1,1992); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §41.035 (Supp. 1991) ($50,000); N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-4-19
(Michie 1989) ($300,000); N.D. Cent. Code §32.12.1-03 (Supp. 1991) ($250,000); Okla. Stat. Ann. titl 51, §154
(West Supp. 1992) ($100,000); Or. Rev. Stat. §30.270 (1991) ($100,000); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §8557 (1982)
($500,000); R.I. Gen. Laws §9-31-2 (1985) ($100,000); S.C. Code Ann. §15-78-120 (Supp. 1991) ($250,000); Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §101.023 (West 1986) ($250,000); Wis. Stat. Ann. §893.82(6) (West Supp. 1991)
($250,000); Wyo. Stat. §1-39-118 (Supp. 1991) ($250,000).
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Sambs, 293 N.W.2d at 514; accord Leliefeld, 659 P.2d at 129; Stanhope. 280 N.W.2d at 719.
In short, it is not the province of the judiciary to second-guess elected officials' weighing of
competing interests and their resolution of the difficult policy questions underlying a partial
waiver of absolute governmental immunity up to a fixed dollar amount. Sre Sambs. 293
N.W.2d at 512; Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 377, 385, (Hall, CJ., dissenting).
Finally, Section 63-30-34 is not arbitrary merely because it may preclude full recovery
by some. Any recovery limitation will do so, precisely because it is intended to do so. A limit
high enough not to exclude any injured party from full recovery would, in fact, be no limit at
all. In rejecting a federal due process challenge to a statutory liability limit for injuries arising
from operation of nuclear power plants, the United States Supreme Court recognized that
whatever ceiling figure is selected will, of necessity, be arbitrary
in the sense that any choice of a figure based on imponderables
like those at issue here can always be so characterized. This is
not, however, the kind of arbitrariness which flaws otherwise
constitutional action.
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environ. Study. 438 U.S. 59, 86 (1978).
For these reasons, it is clear that the retention of immunity and the recovery limitation
both have a reasonable tendency to further the statutory objectives of the Immunity Act and, as
a result, The Immunity Act and the recovery limitations set forth §63-30-34 should not be found
unconstitutional under either the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution or
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution.
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VI. THE PROVISION LIMITING DAMAGES FROM STATE-OWNED
HOSPITALS TO $250.000 DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
In their respective due process analysis in Condemarin. both Justice Durham and Justice
Zimmerman applied a constitutional analysis based upon a combination of the "open courts"
provision, Article I, Section 11, and Article I, Section 7. Because, as set forth above, the "open
courts" provision is not applicable to governmental immunity, the hybrid due process analysis
incorporating both constitutional provisions is inappropriate, and the traditional due process
analysis must be applied.
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution reads:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law.
The traditional substantive due process test is very similar to the minimum scrutiny
standard applied to equal protection analysis.
If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a
proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied . . .
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934); see also, Pruneyard Shopping Center v.
Robins. 447 U.S. 74, 84-85 (1980).
The United States Supreme Court previously addressed a substantive due process
challenge to legislation limiting recovery from private entities engaged in the production of
nuclear energy in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environ. Study. 438 U.S. 59, 98 (1978). There,
the Court concluded that the limitation provision was a classic example of economic regulation,
applied the general presumption of constitutionality, imposed the burden of proof on the party
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challenging the statute, and found that the limitation provision was reasonably related to a
legitimate purpose. Id. 438 U.S. at 83-84.
In this case, for the reasons stated in Section V above, the recovery limitation of the
Immunity Act is reasonably related to a legitimate purpose, and as a result, this Court should
find that it does not violate the right to due process provided under both the United States and
Utah Constitutions. See, Wilson v. Gipson. 753 P.2d 1349, 1353 (Okl. 1988) and Hale v. Port
of Portland. 783 P.2d 506, 517 (Or. 1989) (both rejecting due process challenge to recovery
limitation in governmental immunity statutes).
VDL PLAINTIFFS CANNOT SUSTAIN THEIR BURDEN OF PROVING
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE IMMUNITY ACT IS
CLEARLY AND PALPABLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Plaintiffs' entire argument concerning the 1987 version of the Immunity Act is based on
this Court's decision in Condemarin and the mistaken belief that this Court addressed the 1987
version of the Immunity Act in Condemarin. However, this Court did not address the 1987
version of the Immunity Act in Condemarin. and Condemarin should be reversed for the reasons
set forth above. Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot satisfy their burden of proof because the 1987
version of the Immunity Act is constitutional and must be enforced by this Court.
CONCLUSION
At common law, state entities, such as the University Hospital, were immune from all
tort liability arising from both proprietary and governmental functions. The distinctions made
at common law between state entities, municipalities and private corporations were uniformly
recognized by this Court and were never held to be unconstitutional. The 1987 version of the
Immunity Act retains immunity for state entities for many acts. However, the Immunity Act
40

also waives immunity for many acts, but limits recovery in those circumstances. The
Legislature could have constitutionally retained governmental immunity, thereby precluding
Plaintiffs from any and all recovery from the University Hospital. The Legislature cannot have
acted unconstitutionally by providing Plaintiffs a remedy they did not enjoy at common law and
by simply limiting the available recovery.
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should find the $250,000 recovery limitation
provision of the 1987 version of the Immunity Act constitutional. Based upon this finding, the
Court should rule that Plaintiffs cannot state a claim against Defendants for recommending that
they settle their claims against the University Hospital for $250,000.
DATED this 2^^

day of September, 1992.
SNELL & WILMER

•ffl,uf i n V m .
Thomas L. Kay
Paul D. Newman
Mark O. Morris
Attorneys for Appellant Tim W. Healy
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ADDENDUM 1

ARTICLE I
Sec, 7.

[Due process of law.]

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.

Sec. 11.

[Courts open - Redress of injuries.]

All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or
defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he
is a party.

Sec. 24.

[Uniform operation of laws.]

All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.

ADDENDUM 2

63-30-2.

Definitions •

As used in this chapter:
(3)
"Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivisions
as defined in this chapter.
(4)
(a)
"Governmental function" means any act, failure to act,
operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or not the
act, failure to act, operation, function , or undertaking is characterized as
governmental, proprietary, a core governmental function, unique to government,
undertaken in a dual capacity, essential to or not essential to a government or
governmental function, or could be performed by private enterprise or private
persons.
(b)
A "governmental function" may be performed by
any department, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a
governmental entity.
*

*

*

(7)
"Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, school
district, public transit district, redevelopment agency, special improvement or
taxing district, or other governmental subdivision or public corporation.
*

*

*

(9)
"State" means the state of Utah, and includes any office,
department, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college,
university, or other instrumentality of the state.

63-30-3.

Immunity of governmental entities from suit.

Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental entities are
immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise of a governmental function,
governmentally-owned hospital, nursinghome, or other governmental health care facility, and
from an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program
conducted in either public or private facilities.
The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the construction, repair,
and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental entities are considered to be
governmental functions, and governmental entities and their officers and employees are immune
from suit for any injury or damage resulting from those activities.

63-30-34.

Limit of judgment against governmental entity or employee.

(1)
Except as provided in Subsection (3), if a judgment for damages
for personal injury against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a
governmental entity has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $250,000 for one person
in any one occurrence, or $500,000 for two or more persons in any one
occurrence, the court shall reduce the judgment to that amount, regardless of
whether or not the function giving rise to the injury is characterized as
governmental.
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ADDENDUM 3

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
HIPWELL, SHELLY
PLAINTIFF
VS
SHARP, ROGER T
HEALY, TIM W

CASE NUMBER 910905017 CV
DATE 03/30/92
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK CLB

DEFENDANT

TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY.
D. ATTY.

AFTER REVIEW OF THE PLEADINGS AND AFTER HAVING HEARD ORAL
ARGUMENT ON DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE
COURT HAVING TAKEN ITS DECISION UNDER ADVISEMENT, RULES AS
FOLLOWS:
1. DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ARE DENIED,
FOR THE REASONS SPECIFIED IN PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDA TM OPPOSITION
THERETO.
2. COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS TO PREPARE THE ORDER.
3. THE ISSUE IN DISPUTE IS PIVOTAL AND DISPOSITIVE.
THIS COURT WOULD URGE DEFENDANTS TO PURSUE AN INTERLOCUTORY
APPEAL OF THE DENIAL OF THEIR MOTIONS.

RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq. (£0492)
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq. (#2278)
DOUGLAS H. HOLBROOK, Esq. (#5718)
GARY RHYS JOHNSON, Esq. (T?5729)
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
139 E. South Temple, Suite 2001
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 111
(801) 355-6677
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

SHELLY HIPWELL, an
individual by and through
her guardians, SHERRY
JENSEN and SHAYNE HIPWELL,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
-vsROGER SHARP, TIM W. HEALY,
and DOES I through X,

Civil No. 910905017 CV
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.

The Motions for Summary Judgment of Defendants Roger T.
Sharp and Tim W. Healy came on regularly for hearing before the
above-entitled court on March 30, 1992 at the hour of 10:30 a.m.
Defendant Sharp appeared by and through his counsel of record,
Glenn C. Hanni and Strong & Hanni and Defendant Healy appeared
by and through his counsel of record, Thomas L. Kay of Snell &
Wilmer.

Plaintiff

appeared

by

and

through

her

counsel

of

record, Richard D. Burbidge of Burbidge & Mitchell and Simon
Forgette.
The

court,

having

reviewed

the

respective

motions,

supporting and opposing memoranda, having heard oral argument,
and being fully apprised in this matter,
HEREBY ORDERS

that the Motions for Summary Judgment are

hereby denied.
DATED this

/fl^day of^cfrc?hr; 1992.
BY'THE COURT:

DENNIS FREDERICK
CT COURT JUDGE
Approved as to form:
STR(^^5^>IANNI

G l e n n C. Hanni
A t t o r n e y s for Defendant

Sharp

SNELL & WILMER

^em^^.
Thomas L. Ka^
Attorneys for Defendant Healy
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

Regular May Term, 1992
Shelly Hipwell, an individual
by and through her guardians,
Sherrie Jensen and Shayne
Hipwell,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.
Roger Sharp, Tim W. Healy,
and Does I through X,
Defendants and Appellants.

June 23, 1992

No. 920218
910905017CV

Appellant's Petition for Interlocutory Appeal having
been considered, and the Court being sufficiently advised in
the premises, it is ordered that an Interlocutory Appeal
be, and the same is, granted as prayed.

